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To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn 
these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about 
employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns arise. These can both 
be 'good' (enhancing incentives for effort in developing ideas) and 'bad' (preventing voluntary 
coordination). Our model shows how the firm designs its explicit incentive system and 
organizes work processes to take these conflicting forces into account. The comparative 
statics results suggest a link between the increased use of teams and recent changes in 
labor market returns to skills. 
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A ﬁrm thrives if it fosters innovation that leads to improved products and services, streamlined
production processes or enhanced business strategies. To achieve these goals, members of
the organization have to i) expend eﬀort in developing novel ideas and designs; ii) agree to
coordinate with each other to implement these ideas and designs. Because the quality of
implemented designs and products that employees are associated with inﬂuences their labor
market opportunities, career concerns (Fama 1980, Holmstr¨ om 1982/99) arise. Employees thus
have a stake in their work projects that goes beyond the short-run rewards oﬀered through
the compensation scheme of the ﬁrm.
These career concerns are a mixed blessing for ﬁrms dealing with knowledge workers, as our
model shows. On the one hand, they help motivate employees to exert eﬀort in developing
novel ideas and designs (knowledge inputs). On the other hand, career concerns can stiﬂe
voluntary coordination among employees, and thereby prevent high-quality knowledge inputs
from being turned into product or process improvements. Remarkably, such situations where
employees fail to coordinate arise even if there is no form of competition between agents and
an agent experiences no utility cost when coordinating with a colleague.
So how does a ﬁrm design its explicit compensation scheme to take these conﬂicting forces
into account? The key result in the paper is that either group-based incentives or team
production are optimal – even though they oﬀer opportunities for employees to free-ride on
the eﬀort of a colleague. The advantage of these schemes relative to compensation based
on only an individual’s own performance is that they prevent situations where voluntary
coordination among employees breaks down. Speciﬁcally, group-based incentives are optimal
with relatively weak career concerns, whereas relatively strong career concerns lead to the
adoption of team production. As we argue, this comparative statics result suggests a link
between the increased use of teams and recent changes in labor market returns to skills.
Communication among employees and coordination of their inputs to the production process
are essential for transforming innovative ideas into new or enhanced products or processes (e.g.
West 2002, West and Tjosvold 2003, Janssen, van de Vliert, and West 2004). This is particu-
larly relevant for knowledge-intensive ﬁrms (e.g. Despres and Hiltrop 1995, Mohrman, Cohen,
and Mohrman 1995, Faraj and Sproull 2000, Paulus and Yang 2000, Lawler 2003, Foray 2004).
To create or improve the complex products and systems that these ﬁrms rely on, employees
need to incorporate ideas and designs that are to a large extent tacit knowledge bound to
2the person who developed them.1 Implementing these ideas and designs (knowledge inputs)
requires project members to communicate closely with each other and that they adapt their
respective inputs to the production process so that they are mutually compatible. Thompson
(1967) describes this as “reciprocal interdependence” that calls for coordination by “mutual
adjustment”. Because parties rely on each other to implement their knowledge inputs, it
is crucial for the organization that employees are willing to coordinate: the tacit nature of
knowledge inputs “creates strict dependence between the potential value of the intellectual
asset (e.g., for a ﬁrm or other organization) and the good will of individuals to take deliberate
or voluntary action to share it” (Foray 2004, p.73).
Our model captures these elements in a two-period principal-agent setting. In the ﬁrst period,
a ﬁrm (the principal) employs two risk neutral individuals protected by limited liability (the
agents) to work on a joint project. In the second period, agents receive outside employment
oﬀers from the labor market.
Each agent develops a knowledge input for the ﬁrst-period project that can be of high or
low quality – depending on the (unknown) ability of the agent and the (unobservable) eﬀort
he puts in. A high-quality knowledge input oﬀers the opportunity to enhance the value of
the project along the dimension for which the agent is responsible. Turning it into a better
quality of the actual project outcome however requires coordination in the form of “mutual
adjustment” of both agents’ inputs to the production process. If project members do not agree
to coordinate in this way, high-quality knowledge inputs cannot be implemented and there is
no quality improvement in the project outcome.
Agents have career concerns because the outcome of their ﬁrst-period project provides infor-
mation about their abilities to the labor market in the second period. It is ‘good’ news about
the ability of an agent if his implemented input is of high quality, i.e. he is associated with a
creative idea embodied in a product or process. In contrast, it is ‘bad’ news about the ability of
an agent if the project outcome lacks novelty along the dimension for which he is responsible.
The better the news about an agent, the more the labor market values his skills.
What each agent earns thus depends on the project outcome in the ﬁrst period both directly
– it supplies the performance measures for the principal’s explicit incentive contract – and
indirectly, because the labor market uses this information to make wage oﬀers in the second
period. The more able an agent is thought to be, the higher the second-period wage. The
1The concept of tacit knowledge (e.g. Nonaka 1991, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) encompasses information
that is hard to codify and requires face-to-face communication. It is related to Polanyi’s (1966) notion of tacit
knowing.
3ﬁrm and the market cannot directly observe knowledge inputs because they are tacit knowl-
edge that requires close interaction and the specialized expertise of the project members to
communicate.2
What our ﬁrst set of results show is that career concerns have a detrimental eﬀect on the
willingness of agents to coordinate in the case where only the own achievement of an indi-
vidual is rewarded. By not coordinating with a more able colleague, an agent can impose an
informational externality – create a ‘smoke screen’ – behind which he can hide the lacking
quality of his own project input. The intuition for the somewhat subtle eﬀect developed in the
paper is the following. Faced with a project outcome that lacks novelty along any dimension
for which the two agents are responsible, the market is unsure about the underlying cause.
Did the outcome arise because both agents truly were not able to generate good ideas? Or
was it because they could not agree to coordinate and implement a high-quality knowledge
input available to one of the agents? This uncertainty works in favor of an agent who could
not develop a high-quality knowledge input: the market is more optimistic about his ability
than if coordination occurred and it was revealed that he actually had no good ideas.
As a result, “being in the same boat with the colleague” generates less bad news about an
agent than “standing in the shadow of a more successful colleague.” This ﬁnding is remarkable
because it shows that even if agents do not compete with each other and are otherwise dis-
interested in each others’ payoﬀs, they may impose an informational externality on the joint
project outcome to hide bad news about themselves.
We then show that the principal can avoid coordination failure by moving away from rewarding
individual achievement only. But such a move introduces the opportunity for agents to free-ride
on the eﬀort of the project partner at the stage where knowledge inputs are developed. As this
weakens incentives, it becomes more costly to get the agents to exert eﬀort. When designing
her explicit compensation scheme the principal therefore needs to take these conﬂicting forces
into account.
This leads to our main results. The optimal contract rewards an agent not only for his
own contribution to a project but also for a successfully implemented knowledge input of his
colleague. This either occurs explicitly – through group-performance rewards in addition to
pay based on individual performance; or implicitly – by organizing production around teams.
In the latter case, work processes are organized so that individual performance measures are
not available to the principal and compensation, by necessity, is based on the team outcome.
2As Foray (2004, p.9) puts it, “knowledge is largely unobservable ... tacit knowledge is constantly being
reconstituted, so that a vast world remains perpetually invisible.”
4While both policies avoid the breakdown of voluntary coordination among employees, their
wage costs are diﬀerent. Group-based incentives are optimal when employees’ career concerns
are relatively weak, and team production is the optimal human-resource policy when career
concerns are relatively strong.
This comparative statics result suggests a link between the introduction of innovative human-
resource practices and labor market developments that have aﬀected the strength of career
concerns. With the rapid technological progress over the last three decades, the importance
of “knowledge work” has grown signiﬁcantly in the advanced economies (e.g. Despres and
Hiltrop 1995, OECD 1996, 2001, Foray 2004).
In a parallel development, demand for skilled labor has shifted and made career concerns more
prominent: returns to skill have increased, both linked to easily observed components (such
as education and experience) as well as linked to measures of unobserved ability (e.g. Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce 1993, Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995, Bartel and Sicherman 1999, Galor
and Moav 2000, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002).
According to the comparative statics of our model, ﬁrms should switch to team production
when employees’ work outcomes have a strong eﬀect on their labor market opportunities.
Indeed, the above changes in labor markets – while complex and in some details contro-
versial (e.g. Card and DiNardo 2002, Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008) – coincided with the
introduction of innovative organizational practices that restructure production processes
to rely more on “empowered” teams. For example, in two inﬂuential studies Osterman
(1994, 2000) estimates that by the mid-1990’s more than 60% of U.S. establishments with
over 50 employees adopted teams and other “innovative workplace practices”.3
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. In Section 3
we explain in a simpliﬁed setting how coordination failure may arise because of agents’ career
concerns. Section 4 contains the main analysis and characterizes optimal human-resource
policies. A discussion of our ﬁndings follows in Section 5. All proofs are in Appendix A.
2 Related literature
We discuss in turn the contribution of our paper to the literature on career concerns and on
multi-agent moral hazard problems.
The career concerns literature originated with the seminal work of Fama (1980) and Holm-
3For evidence on complementarities between organizational change and demand for skilled labor see e.g.
Caroli and Reenen (2001).
5str¨ om (1982/99). One strand considers, in a world without explicit contracts, the implications
of career concerns for organizational decisions such as task design (e.g. Dewatripont et al.
1999b, Ortega 2003), individual vs. team production (e.g. Jeon 1996, Bar-Isaac 2007), and
organizational transparency (e.g. Mukherjee 2008). We connect to this strand with our result
that organizing production in teams can be beneﬁcial because it gives less precise signals
about agents’ inputs to the labor market, and thereby removes reputational conﬂicts of
interest between project members. The implications that we derive for the design of explicit
compensation policies contribute to the second strand of the literature, that looks at the
interplay of career concerns and explicit incentives (e.g. Gibbons and Murphy 1992, Meyer
and Vickers 1997, Auriol, Friebel, and Pechlivanos 2002, Koch and Peyrache 2008a, 2008b).
Our ﬁndings relate in particular to previous results where “more information” can hurt the
principal, e.g. because this weakens career concerns incentives (Dewatripont et al. 1999a,
Koch and Peyrache 2008a), undermines the credibility of disciplining actions (Cremer 1995),
induces conformist behavior (Prat 2005), or strengthens the ratchet eﬀect in contracting
(Meyer, Olsen, and Torsvik 1996).
The classic treatments of multi-agent moral hazard problems (Alchian and Demsetz 1972,
Holmstr¨ om 1982) emphasize the aspect of free-riding in teams.4 But as Hamilton, Nickerson,
and Owan (2003, p.466) point out: “Despite obvious concerns about moral hazard, many
ﬁrms do in fact introduce teams even when individual task assignment is feasible and provide
team-based incentives in the hope of improving productivity.”
More generally, the literature shows conditions when it can be optimal to reward not only
individual performance but rather make compensation contingent on the outcome of other
agents’ tasks as well: to insure risk-averse agents against common performance shocks (e.g.
Holmstr¨ om 1979, Lazear and Rosen 1981, Green and Stokey 1983, Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz 1983,
Mookherjee 1984, Corts 2008), induce “helping”, or internalize production externalities (Itoh
1991, Hemmer 1995). In all these models interdependent incentives are optimal only when
there are signiﬁcant production externalities or costs for each of the multiple activities that
an agent engages in.
Repeated interaction between agents may make interdependent incentives optimal as well. In
a multi-agent model with costly helping, Auriol, Friebel, and Pechlivanos (2002) show that
agents repeatedly interacting with the same principal have an incentive to sabotage co-workers
4We focus here on incentive theory. See Gibbons (2003) for a recent discussion of the statistical decision
perspective of Marschak and Radner’s (1972) team theory.
6because higher output leads to a ratchet eﬀect that makes the future compensation contract
for an individual more demanding. To counteract this, the principal needs to oﬀer group-based
incentives. Che and Yoo (2001) show that interdependent incentive schemes or teams may be
optimal if individuals interact over a longer period and can impose negative payoﬀ externalities
on each other (peer sanctions).
Our model complements these existing rationales for group-based incentives and teams: for
these policies to be optimal our setting requires neither repeated interaction between individ-
uals, nor that helping is costly, nor other production externalities.
3 Career concerns and coordination: A simpliﬁed setting
At the heart of our paper is the insight that career concerns can have a detrimental eﬀect on
the coordination process between project members. This section develops the intuition in a
simpliﬁed setting where agents only face a coordination decision to implement ideas and designs
(knowledge inputs) and are motivated only by concerns for their labor-market reputation. We
abstract from eﬀort and from contracts that oﬀer explicit incentives. These elements will be
introduced when we analyze the fully ﬂedged model in Section 4.
Consider two agents i = 1,2 who are involved at date 1 in a joint project to improve a product
or process. An agent can have either high ability (θi = θH) or low ability (θi = θL < θH),
with a common prior of Prob(θi = θH) = α ∈ (0,1). Hence, the ex ante expected ability of an
agent is E[θi] = αθH + (1 − α)θL. A high-quality knowledge input oﬀers the opportunity to
enhance the quality of the project along the dimension for which the individual who developed
this input is responsible. The quality of the knowledge input ki is entirely determined by the
ability of an agent: ki = k(θi) with k(θi = θL) = Li and k(θi = θH) = Hi.
To turn a a high-quality knowledge input ki = Hi into a quality improvement in the project
outcome – i.e. realize the potential input quality – requires coordination in the form of “mu-
tual adjustment” of both project members’ inputs to the production process. Without such
coordination, no quality improvement can be realized and the implemented input of an agent,
xi, is of low quality. When agents agree to coordinate, the implemented inputs achieve their
full potential. That is,
if coordination occurs: implemented input qualities (x1,x2)=potential input qualities (k1,k2);
if no coordination occurs: implemented input qualities (x1,x2)=both of low quality (L1,L2).
Each agent has career concerns because his future earnings depend on the value that the labor
market places on his skills. The labor market assesses the ability of an agent based on the
7implemented project outcome. It does not directly observe what potential the knowledge inputs
oﬀered because their tacit nature makes this prohibitively costly to verify. For simplicity, we
assume that the date-2 continuation utility of an agent equals the expectation that the labor
market forms about his ability: E[θi|project outcome].
We abstract in this section from any contracting and compensation issues by assuming that
the project is important to agents only because of its impact on the second-period earnings,
and that it has no other direct monetary costs or beneﬁts for the agents. In particular, we
assume that coordination is without cost to the agents – this makes it clear that our results
are not driven by a need to internalize direct helping costs.
To summarize the simple ‘bare-bones’ career concerns setting of this section: At date 1, the
two project members observe the quality of their knowledge inputs, and decide whether or not
to coordinate. On his own, an agent can only implement a low-quality input. If the agent
turns out to be of high ability, he can however achieve a quality improvement in his part of
the project, provided that both agents agree to coordinate in implementing his high-quality
knowledge input. At date 2, the labor market updates its beliefs based on the observed quality
of implemented inputs, and determines the agents’ earnings: E[θi|ﬁrst-period outcome].
3.1 Individual records
Consider ﬁrst the scenario where the market is able to inspect the quality of each agent’s
implemented input xi – referred to in the following as a situation with individual records. If
both agents have high-quality knowledge inputs (ki = Hi, i = 1,2), clearly, they will agree to
coordinate: this way the market observes a proﬁle of implemented inputs (H1,H2) and knows
that each agent is talented (θi = θH), which guarantees high future earnings for both. If both
agents have low-quality knowledge inputs (ki = Li, i = 1,2), they cannot improve the product
or process along any dimension, and the project outcome is a proﬁle of implemented inputs
(L1,L2).
Let us turn to the case where only one agent has a high-quality knowledge input. Without
loss of generality, assume it is agent 1. The product or process cannot be improved along the
dimension for which agent 2 is responsible because he only has a low-quality knowledge input,
so the implemented input x2 = L2 for sure. Thus coordination does not help agent 2 to gain
anything for his own labor-market reputation.
What if the market is pessimistic and does not expect that an agent coordinates in such a
situation? This would mean that the observed input qualities then are (L1,L2) – the same as
when both agents have low ability. The market takes this into account when forming beliefs
8about an agent after seeing a project outcome (L1,L2): with probability (1−α)2 the outcome
arose because both agents lack talent (so a given agent’s ability is θL); whereas with probability
2α(1 − α) it arose because only one of the agents has a high-quality input but cannot show
this for lack of coordination with his project partner (so a given agent’s expected ability is
(θL+θH)/2). According to Bayes’ rule, the expected ability for agent i = 1,2 following project
outcome (L1,L2) hence is
E[θi|L1,L2] = θL +
α
1 + α
(θH − θL). (1)
This implies that agent 2 actually is strictly better oﬀ by not coordinating – conﬁrming the
market’s pessimism. Suppose he did coordinate. Then the project outcome (H1,L2) would
reveal that coordination indeed occurred, leaving the market to conclude that the agent’s low
input quality stems from a lack of talent, so E[θ2|H1,L2] = θL < E[θ2|L1,L2]. In other words,
not coordinating with his more able project partner allows agent 2 to create a ‘smoke screen’ of
collective mediocrity that masks his own inability to develop a high-quality knowledge input.
This strategy is successful in equilibrium: with a project outcome (L1,L2) the market cannot
disentangle the possible causes, and therefore factors in for both agents the possibility that
they might be talented but unable to show this for lack of coordination with a less able project
partner.5 To summarize, in such a smoke-screen equilibrium either both agents implement
high-quality inputs or none of them does.
There is, of course, the alternative that the market optimistically thinks that an agent will
always agree to coordinate when he is indiﬀerent between coordinating and not coordinating.
In this case we would have E[θ2|H1,L2] = E[θ2|L1,L2] = θL and coordination would indeed be
a best response (given our assumption that coordination is costless). This ‘coordination equi-
librium’ is however is not robust:6 Suppose there is a small probability that a low-ability agent
does not coordinate with a more able project partner (this is a best response for him in any
case). This implies that there is some chance of reaching the outcome (L1,L2) even if one of the
agents has a high-quality knowledge input (because of a tremble in the coordination decision).
So the outcome (L1,L2) still leaves open the possibility that agent i = 1,2 is talented, whereas
the outcome (Li,H−i) reveals that agent i lacks talent.7 Hence, E[θi|Li,H−i] < E[θi|L1,L2],
5Even if the market can distinguish situations where coordination occurred and where not, the ‘smoke-screen’
eﬀect persists, as we show in Appendix C.
6An alternative way to see why the ‘coordination equilibrium’ is not robust, is to assume that coordination
entails a positive but arbitrarily small utility cost. This breaks the tie between coordinating or not when an
agent has a low-quality input and makes coordination failure the only possible equilibrium outcome.
7Bayes’ rule pins down beliefs because the information sets (L1,L2) and (Li,H−i) both are reached with
positive probability.
9making coordination failure strictly optimal for an agent with knowledge input Li. Proposition
1 below captures this formally by applying Selten’s (1975) trembling-hand perfection criterion.
3.2 Team record
Suppose now that the project is organized instead as team production, and provides only
a joint performance measure that does not allow attributing inputs to the individual team
members. To reﬂect that the market only observes the team record, i.e. an anonymous proﬁle
of input qualities, we drop the subscripts from the input proﬁle. That is, the market observes
(L,H) both if (L1,H2) or (H1,L2). Hence, both agents in a team share the same reputation,
which is the key diﬀerence from the individual-records setting. Clearly, this does not change
anything if both agents have high-quality knowledge inputs – they will coordinate and reveal
that they both are talented: E[θi|H,H] = θH. The incentives to coordinate however change if
the team can implement only one high-quality input. Now the agents have a common interest
in increasing the perceived average ability level for the team, so coordination strictly pays oﬀ
for both agents: the reputation that the team member with the (now anonymous) low-quality
knowledge input achieves from coordination,
E[θi|L,H] = θL +
1
2
(θH − θL). (2)
exceeds that arising when no high-quality inputs are implemented, E[θi|L,L] = θL. This
outcome is indeed the only possible equilibrium. Why can a smoke-screen equilibrium as above
not exist? Even if the market expected coordination failure, i.e. attributed in case of proﬁle
(L,L) to each agent the same reputation as in (1), the team member with the low-quality
knowledge input would be strictly better oﬀ coordinating with his more able colleague:8
E[θi|L,H] = θL +
1
2
(θH − θL) > θL +
α
1 + α
(θH − θL). (3)
We summarize our ﬁndings in the following result.
Proposition 1 (The ‘bare-bones’ career concerns setting)
With individual records, there is a unique trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium in which
coordination fails unless both agents have high-quality knowledge inputs (smoke-screen equilib-
rium). With a team record, there is a unique trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium in which
agents always coordinate to implement high-quality knowledge inputs.
It turns out that the driving forces underlying the result do not hinge on ﬁne modeling details.
The result extends to settings where there are more than two possible output levels (Appendix
81/2 > α/(1 + α) because α < 1.
10B), the market can observe in addition to the implemented inputs a signal whether or not
coordination occurred (Appendix C), the market has asymmetric priors about the agents’
abilities (Appendix D), and where implemented inputs are only observed if the project turns
out to be successful (Appendix E).
Despite its simplicity, the above setting oﬀers an important lesson: career concerns can have a
detrimental eﬀect on cooperation. If implemented inputs in a project can be closely associated
with an individual, he may inﬂuence the project outcome to hide own shortcomings. By not
coordinating with a more able colleague, an agent can impose an informational externality –
create a ‘smoke screen’ – behind which he can hide the lacking quality of his own project input.
Interestingly, this sort of behavior is in line with an often expressed feeling that “it is better
that everyone is in the same boat with me than that I stand in the shadow of the successes of
others”. While rivalries, jealousy and competition among peers may often be the cause, our
setup shows that one needs to be cautious even if these elements are absent. Put diﬀerently,
even if an individual does not care about the failure or success of his colleagues per se, he may
still gain from inﬂuencing the outcomes of his colleagues to change the information content of
performance measures that others use to evaluate him.
Team production removes such reputational conﬂicts of interest. Because it creates an anony-
mous record of inputs, it aligns the parties’ interests in increasing the average reputation for
the team. Indeed the role of teams in enhancing cooperation among the members of an organi-
zation is often viewed by economists, organizational psychologists as well as management and
human resource scholars as one of the main reasons why ﬁrms rely on them rather than on struc-
tures that lead to individually attributable performance measures (e.g. Wageman 1995, Che
and Yoo 2001, Hayton 2005). But reduced transparency about individuals’ inputs also creates
problems. Because rewards in a team accrue to all members, an individual can free-ride on his
team mates’ eﬀort. This makes it more diﬃcult to provide incentives for eﬀort at the stage of
developing knowledge inputs. We turn to this issue in the next section.
4 Eﬀort, coordination & explicit incentives
The success of an organization depends on its ability to foster the coordination needed to turn
good ideas into new or improved products and services. But good ideas have to be developed
in the ﬁrst place, which requires that employees exert eﬀort. What features should the human-
resource system of an organization have to motivate both the creation and implementation of
knowledge inputs? The previous section suggests that a close link between individual project
11members and their contributions to the implemented project may be problematic, and that
team production may facilitate the implementation of knowledge inputs. However, when it
comes to incentives for eﬀort in developing knowledge inputs, teams suﬀer from the well
known free-rider problem (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Holmstr¨ om 1982). To analyze how a
ﬁrm optimally takes into account these conﬂicting forces when designing its human-resource
system we now enrich the two-period, two-agent setting from the previous section.
4.1 The model
Agents. In the ﬁrst period, the principal (‘she’) hires two ex ante identical risk neutral
agents (‘he’) i = 1,2 to work on a project. Agents are protected by limited liability and have
an outside option with life-time expected utility normalized to 0. The ability of an agent,
θi ∈ [0,1], is initially unknown to both the principal and the agents. The common prior has
density f(θi) with mean ¯ θ ≡ E[θi] and variance σ2 ≡ V ar[θi]. In the second period, each agent
has access to a labor market for experienced workers. There the principal and n > 2 other
potential employers simultaneously bid a wage for the services of each agent (see below).
Technology. The project in the ﬁrst-period requires agents to develop knowledge inputs,
and coordinate with each other to implement these. The knowledge input of an agent can be of
high quality (ki = Hi) or low quality (ki = Li). It takes both (unobservable) eﬀort and talent
to develop high-quality knowledge inputs, and the more able the agent the higher the impact
of his eﬀort. To capture this notion that the ability θi of an agent and his eﬀort e ∈ {0,1} are
complements, we assume that
Prob(ki = Hi) = eθi, Prob(ki = Li) = 1 − eθi.
Eﬀort causes a utility cost c(e = 1) = c > 0, whereas c(e = 0) = 0. As described in Section
3, project members have to adapt their respective inputs to the production process to be
mutually compatible. When agents agree to coordinate, the implemented inputs achieve their
full potential: (x1,x2) = (k1,k2). Without such coordination, the implemented inputs of both
agents are of low quality: (x1,x2) = (L1,L2). The principal obtains revenue vx1,x2 from the
project at the end of the ﬁrst period. It increases with the quality of implemented inputs:
vHH > vHL = vLH > vLL.
The human-resource policy. Human-resource practices include both the design of work
processes and compensation procedures. The former determines what performance measures
become available and how informative they are about employees’ contributions (e.g. Dewa-
tripont et al. 1999b, Ortega 2003, Jeon 1996, Bar-Isaac 2007). For example, processes cen-
12tered around individual task assignments may allow observing individual inputs to a completed
project. In contrast, individual contributions are less transparent in a team-based organization
that promotes autonomy and “empowers” team members. We capture this notion by assuming
that the principal chooses an information regime when contracting with the agents. Under
the individual-records (IR) regime, she adopts job structures that make it possible to attribute
implemented inputs xi to individual project members. Under the team-record (TR) regime,
the principal organizes production in teams, for which performance is measurable only in the
form of an anonymous proﬁle of implemented inputs (x,x).
The principal’s compensation contract has a ﬁxed wage w1 in the ﬁrst period and a
performance-contingent bonus τ(ﬁrst period outcome) that can condition on implemented in-
put qualities. As explained in Section 3, because of the tacit nature of knowledge inputs it is
prohibitively costly for the principal to verify the potential quality of agents’ inputs. Agents
are protected by limited liability and cannot commit to staying with the principal in the second
period (because the law prohibits indentured labor).
The second period. In the second period, agents have access to a labor market for ex-
perienced workers where the principal and n > 2 other potential employers (‘the market’)
simultaneously bid a wage for the services of each agent. If agent i switches to a new em-
ployer, his output is worth θi. If he remains with the principal, he produces θi+κ, where κ > 0
is ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital accumulated during the ﬁrst period. As a result, the principal
always matches the competitors’ bids and the agent earns a second-period wage of at least
E[θi|ﬁrst-period outcome].9 For simplicity there is no discounting. As is standard in a career
concerns model, there is symmetric information between the diﬀerent employers. That is, the
market observes the principal’s choice of contract and agents’ ﬁrst-period project outcome.
Timing and information structure. In the ﬁrst period, the principal chooses
an organizational structure (IR- or TR-regime) and oﬀers the two agents a contract
{w1,τ(ﬁrst-period outcome)}. In case either agent rejects it, the principal has zero proﬁts
and agents have a life-time utility of zero. If the contract is accepted by both agents, they
engage in (unobservable) eﬀort to develop inputs, and decide whether to coordinate with their
project partner after (privately) learning about the quality of their knowledge input. Then the
project outcome realizes and is observed by market participants. While the implemented input
9This reduced-form speciﬁcation and the normalization of the second-period productivity to equal θi are
adopted for analytical simplicity. It could be replaced by any setup where the agent’s utility from a second-
period contract is increasing in his expected type. This is, of course, the precondition for career concerns in the
ﬁrst period to have any meaning.
13qualities (x1,x2) can be attributed to each individual agent under the individual-record (IR)
structure, only an anonymous proﬁle of input qualities (x,x) is observed under the team-record
(TR) structure.10 In the second period, the principal matches competing bids from the labor
market to retain agents and capture their ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital.
Additional assumptions. From the extant literature it is well known that the principal may
adopt an interdependent compensation scheme or teams to foster cooperation if helping others
is costly, or if there are complementarities between the two agents’ activities (see Section 2).
To bring out the distinctive features of our model we thus make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 Coordination to implement high-quality knowledge inputs imposes no costs on
agents. There are no production externalities between the two agent’s activities other than the
need for coordination: revenue increases by a constant amount ∆v ≡ 1 for each implemented
high-quality input, i.e. vHH − vHL = vLH − vLL = ∆v.
The normalization ∆v ≡ 1 is adopted to avoid notational clutter. To make the problem
interesting, we assume that eﬀort is eﬃcient. Eﬀort (e = 1) and subsequent coordination by
agents leads to an increase in expected revenue per head from vLL/2 (for e = 0) to
Z 1
0
[vLL/2 + θ∆v]f(θ)dθ = vLL/2 + ¯ θ. (4)
This therefore gives:
Assumption 2 Eﬀort towards developing knowledge inputs is eﬃcient: c ≤ ¯ θ.
Moreover, we assume that there are suﬃciently many vacant positions so that agents do not
compete with each other in the second-period labor market. This rules out impediments to
cooperation stemming from any form of competition between agents (e.g. Lazear 1989, Baliga
and Sj¨ ostr¨ om 2001, Chen 2003). We solve for Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria (e.g. Fudenberg
and Tirole 1986).
Except for the ﬁrst-period wage w1, the earnings of an agent depend on the ﬁrst-period out-
come: he receives a performance-contingent bonus τi(ﬁrst-period outcome) ≥ 0; and in the
second period the principal matches the market wage E[θi|ﬁrst-period outcome] to retain the
agent. To simplify formulas, we will treat both performance-contingent components as part of
the second-period wage. This is without loss of generality (because the principal and agents
10 That is, the IR-information set is {(L1,L2),(L1,H2),(H1,L2),(H1,H2)} and the TR-information set is
{(L,L),(L,H),(H,H)}, where (L,H) = (L1,H2) ∩ (H1,L2).
14share the same discount factor – normalized to one in our model), and allows us to analyze
contracts in terms of anticipated second-period earnings:11
w2i(ﬁrst-period outcome) = τi(ﬁrst-period outcome) + E[θi|ﬁrst-period outcome]. (5)
4.2 Analysis
To complement Section 3 – which isolated the impact of career concerns on voluntary coor-
dination – we start oﬀ our analysis with a second benchmark case, which isolates the eﬀect
of career concerns on eﬀort incentives (no-coordination-stage benchmark). We then put ev-
erything together and analyze contracting when production requires both eﬀort to develop
knowledge inputs and coordination between agents to implement high-quality inputs. Based
on these ﬁndings we then, in a last step, characterize the optimal human resource policy.
4.3 No-coordination-stage benchmark (NB)
The no-coordination-stage benchmark (NB) looks at the hypothetical case where agents do
not need to coordinate to implement high-quality inputs. It will help assess the impact that
the need for (costless) coordination has on the human resource system. The absence of a
coordination stage eﬀectively turns the production setting into two single-agent moral hazard
problems with independent realizations of uncertainty. The optimal contract uses an IR-
regime and conditions payments only on an agent’s own input quality. This avoids the free-
riding problems that would arise with group incentives or when moving to team production
(TR-regime).12
As we saw above, eﬀort increases the expected revenue per head by ¯ θ. But an agent will only
engage in (unobservable) eﬀort if the anticipated second-period wages w2(xi) = E[θi|xi]+τ(xi)
satisfy his incentive constraint:
¯ θw2(Hi) + (1 − ¯ θ)w2(Li) − c ≥ w2(Li) ⇔ w2(Hi) − w2(Li) ≥ c/¯ θ. (6)
The principal however only has partial control over the anticipated wages. Because the agent
is free to move to another employer in the second period, the principal must match the agent’s
wage opportunities in the market for experienced workers. All the principal can do is contrac-
tually bind herself to ‘top up’ the second-period market wage with a performance-related bonus
11Another way to think of this is that the principal’s contract ﬁxes the intra-ﬁrm wage evolution to anticipate
outside opportunities in the second period, i.e. it speciﬁes directly {w1,w2i(ﬁrst-period outcome)}.
12This is a standard result which – for reasons of brevity – we state without proof here as our later analysis
will clearly show the driving forces.
15τ(xi) ≥ 0 (the agent is protected by limited liability). So to create the wage spread required
by the incentive constraint (6) as cheaply as possible, the principal keeps the anticipated wage
w2(Li) at the lowest possible level by committing not to pay more than is necessary to retain
the agent in the second period. That is, τ(Li) = 0 and13







1 − ¯ θ
dθ = ¯ θ −
σ2
1 − ¯ θ
. (7)













Reputational incentives arise because E[θi|Hi] > E[θi|Li]. Taking these into account, the
















Overall, to implement eﬀort and retain the agent in the second period the principal’s contract
has to lead to second-period wages w2(Li) = E[θi|Li] and






If the required bonus for a high-quality input (τ(Hi)) is zero, this means that career concerns
alone push the agent to exert eﬀort. With the anticipated second-period wages in place, we now
turn to the agent’s participation constraint w1+
R 1




[θτ(Hi) + θE[θi|Hi] + (1 − θ)E[θi|Li]] f(θ)dθ = w1 + ¯ θτ(Hi) + ¯ θ ≥ c. (11)
The last part reﬂects the martingale property of beliefs: E [E[θ|xi]] = ¯ θ. Because the agent
is protected by limited liability, Assumption 2 implies that w1 = 0. The agent has a limited
liability rent.
What is the cost of implementing ﬁrst-period eﬀort? Whether the agent puts in eﬀort or not,
the principal will at least match the outside oﬀers in the second-period labor market: retaining
the agent allows capturing the return to ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, κ > 0. So the extra cost
of getting the agent to work stems only from the bonus τ(Hi) that the principal has to pay on
top of the agent’s market value when his implemented input has high quality (xi = Hi). So
the eﬀort implementation cost per head is simply the amount of bonus payments she expects












13Note that w2(Li) ≥ 0 because E[θi|Li] is in the support [0,1] of θ, implying the following implicit constraint
on the parameter space: σ
2 ≤ ¯ θ (1−¯ θ). Another way to see this: V ar[θ] = E[θ
2]−¯ θ
2 ≤ ¯ θ−¯ θ
2 because 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
16Assumption 2 implies that it indeed pays oﬀ for the principal to implement eﬀort because the
expected gain in revenue per head ¯ θ ≥ c > ECNB. We summarize this in the following result.
Lemma 1 (No-coordination-stage benchmark)
In the no-coordination-stage benchmark, where an agent can implement a high-quality input on
his own, incentives based on individual performance (IR-regime) are optimal, and the eﬀort






1−¯ θ if σ2 ≤ (1 − ¯ θ)c,
0 otherwise.
The more uncertainty there is about the ability of an agent (higher σ2), the more the market
learns about an agent from observing the ﬁrst-period outcome. This, in turn, translates into
a stronger desire for the agent to exert eﬀort to inﬂuence his reputation and lowers the eﬀort
implementation cost. The no-coordination-stage benchmark case thus shows that the presence
of career concerns itself does not create problems for eﬀort incentives. To the contrary, career
concerns are ‘good’ because they motivate the agent to put eﬀort into developing knowledge
inputs. How does the picture change when we add the coordination stage? The next section
addresses this.
4.4 Incentives based on own individual performance only
The individual-records (IR) regime in our main model diﬀers from the no-coordination-stage
benchmark in only one aspect: agents need to coordinate to implement high-quality knowledge
inputs. This diﬀerence may seem innocuous given our assumption that coordination is without
cost to the agents. Therefore, let us investigate what happens if the principal na¨ ıvely follows
the policy appropriate for the no-coordination-stage benchmark, to base incentives only on the
agent’s own performance.
In this case there is the ‘carrot’ of topping up the market wage if a high-quality knowledge
input by the agent is implemented (w2i(Hi,·) ≥ E[θi|Hi,·]), and the ‘stick’ of not paying more
than necessary to retain the agent in the second period if his implemented input is of low
quality (w2i(Li,·) = E[θi|Li,·]). Solving backwards, consider the situation in which agents
ﬁnd themselves after they have developed their knowledge inputs. Faced with the above type
of contract, an agent who only has a low-quality knowledge input can gain nothing from
coordinating with his project partner because this reveals his lack of a high-quality knowledge
17input:
E[θi|Li,H−i] = E[θi|Li] = ¯ θ −
σ2
1 − ¯ θ
. (13)
Along the lines of Section 3, suppose that the market expects coordination failure (CF) in
such a situation. Applying Bayes’ rule, the market wage when both implemented inputs are
of low quality then is
E[θi|L1,L2]CF =
(1 − ¯ θ)2
1 − ¯ θ2 E[θi|Li] +
2 ¯ θ(1 − ¯ θ)
1 − ¯ θ2
(E[θi|Li] + E[θi|Hi])
2
= ¯ θ −
¯ θ
1 − ¯ θ2 σ2. (14)
As E[θi|L1,L2]CF > E[θi|Li,H−i], not to coordinate is indeed a strict best response for an
agent who has only a low-quality knowledge input – conﬁrming the market’s coordination
failure expectation.14 The situation mirrors the smoke-screen equilibrium from Proposition
1. Again, the outcome where the market expects coordination to always occur is not robust.
Indeed, it is easy to verify that Proposition 1 carries over to the coordination-stage continu-
ation game that we are looking at here, where incentives are based on the agent’s individual
performance only:15
Corollary 1 (Incentives based on own individual performance only)
Incentives based on an agent’s own individual performance only lead to a ‘smoke-screen contin-
uation equilibrium’, in which coordination fails unless both agents develop high-quality knowl-
edge inputs.
The result shows that the need for coordination has a substantial eﬀect on the production
outcome – even though the coordinating actions themselves are without direct cost to the
agents. As in Section 3, individualized incentives leave scope for setting up a ‘smoke screen’
behind which an agent can hide his own deﬁciencies. In other words, agents exploit the
informational externality that they can impose on the project partner whenever this brightens
their own future career prospects. With individual incentive pay, it is better for an agent to
have the project partner share the same fate than to stand in the shadow of his success. While
career concerns are ‘good’ for eﬀort incentives – as we have seen in the no-coordination-stage
benchmark – they are ‘bad’ for coordination under individualized incentives and lead to lower
expected revenue for the principal.
4.5 Coordination-enhancing human-resource policies
The beneﬁt from a human-resource policy that prevents the kind of coordination failure that
arises in continuation equilibria with individualized incentives when only one agent has access
14Note that E[θi|L1,L2]






H = E[θi|Hi], θ
L = E[θi|Li] and α = ¯ θ into the equations of Section 3.
18to a high-quality knowledge input is that expected revenue increases by 2 ¯ θ(1 − ¯ θ). We now
turn to the additional costs of such a policy, examining ﬁrst group-based incentives under the
IR-regime, and then team production.
4.5.1 Group-based incentives (IR-regime)
The gap in anticipated second-period wages w2i(Li,H−i) and w2i(L1,L2) is what causes coor-
dination failure under individualized incentives. To close this gap, the principal can include in
her contract a provision that oﬀsets the reputational gain E[θi|L1,L2]CF−E[θi|Li,H−i] that an
agent derives by not coordinating with a more successful project partner in the ‘smoke-screen
continuation equilibrium’ from Corollary 1. If the contract includes such a group-performance
component
τi(Li,H−i) = E[θi|L1,L2]CF − E[θi|Li,H−i] =
σ2
1 − ¯ θ2, (15)
coordination indeed becomes a best response for an agent who is less successful than his
colleague. This is true even if the market expected coordination failure (CF) for this case.
The contractual provision τi(Li,H−i) therefore leads to a unique16 continuation equilibrium,
in which agents always coordinate when there is a high-quality knowledge input available and,
consistent with this, the market expects no coordination failure on the equilibrium path:
E[θi|L1,L2] = E[θi|Li,H−i] = ¯ θ −
σ2
1 − ¯ θ
. (16)
It turns out that under certain circumstances contracts with group-based incentives 0 <
τi(Li,H−i) < σ2
1−¯ θ2 can also prevent coordination failure. Namely, if the market then be-
lieves that coordination will occur, coordination is indeed always a strict best response. There
however is an alternative continuation equilibrium where the market has coordination failure
expectations, and then not coordinating is a strict best response for an agent who has not
developed a high-quality knowledge input. While this multiplicity of continuation equilibria is
interesting, it will play no role in our main results as we explain below. We therefore relegate
the details to Appendix A and summarize our ﬁndings ﬁndings in the following result.
16To be precise, uniqueness obtains if the agent has a strict best response, i.e. τi(Li,H−i) > E[θi|L1,L2]
CF −
E[θi|Li,H−i]. Instead of imposing a ﬁnite minimum compensation increment (which would make derivations
extremely messy with no added economic insight) we adopt the usual convention of breaking the tie to achieve
existence of equilibrium in the overall game.
19Lemma 2 (Group-based incentives (IR-regime) continuation equilibria)
In the continuation game that follows the contract oﬀer stage,
• a contract with τi(Li,H−i) = σ2
1−¯ θ2 induces a unique continuation equilibrium, where
agents always coordinate to implement high-quality knowledge inputs;





there exist two continuation equilibria:
i) a ‘smoke-screen continuation equilibrium’ where coordination fails unless both
agents develop high-quality knowledge inputs;
ii) an equilibrium where agents always coordinate to implement high-quality knowledge
inputs.
This result allows us to characterize for the possible continuation equilibria the cost per agent
of implementing eﬀort and always achieving coordination under group-based incentives. If
τi(Li,H−i) → 0 suﬃces to convince the market not to expect coordination failure, implemen-
tation costs reach their lower bound – which corresponds to ECNB from the no-coordination-
stage benchmark (NB) in Lemma 1. Conversely, implementation costs reach their upper bound
in the continuation equilibrium induced by τi(Li,H−i) = σ2
1−¯ θ2. This leads to the following
result:
Lemma 3 (Group-based incentives (IR-regime))
To prevent coordination failure in the continuation game under the IR-regime, the contract
must include a group-performance component τi(Li,H−i) > 0. The expected cost per head of
implementing eﬀort and preventing coordination failure with group-based incentives is bounded
below by the implementation cost under the no-coordination-stage benchmark ECNB (stated
in Lemma 1) and above by EC








1−¯ θ2 if σ2 ≤ 1−¯ θ2
1+¯ θ (1−¯ θ) c,
¯ θ
1+¯ θ σ2 otherwise.
Two things about the wage structure are striking. First, an agent receives a sizable reward for
the successful implementation of a high-quality input by his project partner, even though his
direct cost of coordination is zero: w2i(Li,H−i) = w2i(L1,L2) + τi(Li,H−i). This shows how
group-based incentives may arise also in a setting where it there is no need to compensate for
costly helping activities.
Second, the group-performance pay component τi(Li,H−i) does not capture the entire cost of
achieving coordination. The reason is that this pay component itself introduces the opportu-
nity to free-ride on the eﬀort of the project partner and makes shirking more attractive. An
20agent who shirks would still get τi(Li,H−i) in addition to his market value of E[θi|Li] whenever
the project partner develops a high-quality knowledge input. In contrast, if no coordination
stage were necessary – as in the no-coordination-stage benchmark – a shirking agent would
never earn more than E[θi|Li]. To prevent shirking therefore requires a higher anticipated wage
for the case that an agent has himself a successfully implemented high-quality input than the
required wage under the no-coordination-stage benchmark (NB). Overall we therefore have:
w2i(Hi,·) ≥ wNB
2 (Hi) > w2i(Li,H−i) > w2i(L1,L2) = wNB
2 (Li).17
While there are multiple continuation equilibria, it turns out that we can nevertheless arrive
at a precise prediction about the optimal human-resource policy. The reason is as follows.
In an equilibrium of the overall contracting game, the choice of compensation contract de-
pends on how the resulting proﬁt compares with the alternative continuation proﬁts from
other policies. The market (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs determine for each possible IR-regime
contract with τi(Li,H−i) ∈ (0, σ2
1−¯ θ2) which continuation equilibrium would be played – the
one with or without coordination failure. In contrast, the continuation equilibrium induced by
τi(Li,H−i) = σ2
1−¯ θ2 is unique and therefore ‘available’ to the principal in any equilibrium of the
overall contracting game. So if group-based incentives pay oﬀ in this case where they are at
their most expensive (ECIR = EC
IR), then they must be part of the optimal human-resource
policy in any equilibrium of the overall contracting game. It turns out that this argument will
sharply pin down (in Proposition 3) when group-based incentives are and when they are not
optimal – so that the multiplicity of continuation equilibria will actually play no role in our
main results.
4.5.2 Team production (TR-regime)
To foster coordination, an alternative human-resource strategy is to revert to a team production
structure – this was one lesson from Section 3. Indeed, under the team-record (TR) regime
agents always have a shared interest in implementing high-quality knowledge inputs: anything
that helps push up the average reputation of the team is good for the individual agent as well.
What does the TR-contract structure look like? It oﬀers a bonus τi(H,H) ≥ 0 and the princi-
pal simply matches the market wage otherwise. The reason is that whenever two high-quality
knowledge inputs are implemented the principal knows for sure that the agents exerted ef-
fort. All other output states could potentially also be reached if either one of the agents
shirked, because input quality is not individually attributable. Speciﬁcally, the principal min-
17w
NB
2 (Hi) ≥ E[θi|Hi,·] > E
CF[θi|L1,L2] ≥ E[θi|L1,L2] + τi(Li,H−i) = w2i(Li,H−i) [the last inequality
follows from (15) and Lemma 2].
21imizes the cost of providing incentives by concentrating rewards in the output state (H,H)
as this is most informative about the agent’s eﬀort. Or, put more formally, the likelihood
ratio prob(x,x|eﬀorti)/prob(x,x|no eﬀorti) is maximized in state (x,x) = (H,H).18 Hence,
w2i(H,H) = τi(H,H) + E[θi|H,H], and for the other states (x,x) ∈ {(L,L),(L,H)} we
simply have w2i(x,x) = E[θi|x,x]. The incentive constraint thus becomes
¯ θ2 (τi(H,H) + E[θi|H,H]) + 2 ¯ θ(1 − ¯ θ)E[θi|H,L] + (1 − ¯ θ)2 E[θi|L,L] − c
≥ ¯ θE[θi|H,L] + (1 − ¯ θ)E[θi|L,L]. (17)
This leads to the per capita implementation cost under team production given in the following
result.
Lemma 4 (Team production (TR-regime))
The expected cost per head of implementing eﬀort and preventing coordination failure with






2(1−¯ θ) if σ2 ≤ 2(1 − ¯ θ)c,
0 otherwise.
(18)
While the TR-regime always achieves voluntary coordination because team members’ inputs
are not individually attributable, this very fact makes it harder to provide agents with incen-
tives to exert eﬀort in developing knowledge inputs. The well known moral hazard in teams
problem arises (Holmstr¨ om 1982): an agent who shirks can still beneﬁt from his team mate’s
eﬀort because w2i(L,H) = E[θi|L,H] > w2i(L,L) = E[θi|L,L]. Therefore, as is easy to verify,
the per capita implementation cost is higher than in the no-coordination-stage benchmark
(NB): ECNB < ECTR.
4.6 Optimal human-resource policies
Our results thus far tell us about the costs and beneﬁts of preventing coordination failure. The
beneﬁt is that these policies avoid the expected loss in revenue 2 ¯ θ(1 − ¯ θ) that occurs under
a contract that bases rewards on an agent’s own performance only. Preventing coordination
failure however creates a free-riding opportunity that raises the cost of providing eﬀort incen-
tives. So does it actually pay to put in place such a cooperation-enhancing human-resource
policy, and if it does, under what conditions? It turns out that the answer is sharp:
18See Demougin and Fluet (1998) for a detailed discussion of ranking diﬀerent information systems based on
likelihood ratios in moral hazard problems with risk neutral agents that are protected by limited liability. For
a more general discussion see e.g. Laﬀont and Martimort (2002).
22Proposition 2 (Optimality of group-based incentives or team production)
It is optimal to foster coordination, using either group-based incentives (IR-regime) or team
production (TR-regime). Incentives tied exclusively to an agent’s own individual performance
are never optimal.
The proof in Appendix A shows that the expected proﬁt under team production is always
higher than if the contract oﬀers incentives based on own individual performance only under
the IR-regime. This leaves as sole alternative group-based incentives.
How does the contracting environment inﬂuence which speciﬁc human resource policy is op-
timal in our model? The principal achieves cooperation by rewarding an agent for coordinat-
ing with a more successful project partner. Under team production this reward arises from
the increase in second-period wages caused by a high-quality input in the team’s project,
E[θi|L,H] − E[θi|L,L]. Under group-based incentives (IR-regime) the principal pays an ex-
plicit bonus τi(Li,H−i). Both types of rewards create an opportunity to free-ride, and thereby
increase the implementation cost.
It turns out that group-based incentives leads to lower free-riding costs than team production
(this is true for all cooperation-inducing continuation equilibria from Lemma 2).19 The advan-
tage of team production however is that the joint-performance reward arises implicitly through
the market wages, whereas under the IR-regime the principal has to pay out the group-based
compensation component τi(Li,H−i) > 0 in addition to what is needed to retain the agent in
the second period. So, intuitively, teams function well when the career opportunities in the
second-period market oﬀer suﬃciently strong incentives for the agents to also overcome the
free-riding problem in the team. When career concerns are less powerful, the principal needs
to oﬀer additional explicit incentives, and thus bears part of the eﬀort implementation cost.
In this case, group-based incentives are the more cost-eﬀective way of inducing coordination.
The next result formalizes the intuition.
19Intuitively, because w
TR
2i (L,L) = w
IC
2i (L1,L2), the severity of the free-riding problem depends on what an
agent who shirks earns when his colleague develops a high-quality knowledge input. Under the IR-regime, a
shirking agent gains at most what he could get by not coordinating in a smoke-screen equilibrium: τi(Li,H−i) ≤
E[θi|L1,L2]
CF − E[θi|Li]. As, w
IR
2i (Li,H−i) = E[θi|Li] + τi(Li,H−i) we have w
IR
2i (Li,H−i) ≤ E[θi|L1,L2]
CF.
But in a smoke-screen equilibrium the market factors in the possibility that both agents only have low-quality
knowledge inputs, so E[θi|L1,L2]
CF < E[θi|L,H] = w
TR
2i (L,H).
23Figure 1: Optimal human-resource policy [parametric example with ¯ θ = 0.4]
Proposition 3 (Optimal human-resource policies)
The principal organizes production under the IR-regime with group-based incentives if career
concerns are relatively weak in relation to the eﬀort cost (σ2 ≤ ˆ σ2(c)). If career concerns are
relatively strong (σ2 > ˆ σ2(c)), the TR-regime with team incentives is optimal, where
ˆ σ2(c) = 2(1 − ¯ θ)c.
The proof in Appendix A consists of a comparison of implementation costs under the two
regimes for varying strength of career concerns (measured by the parameter σ2).
The result suggests that team production should emerge in situations where career concerns
tend to be relatively important. Group-based incentives should dominate when career concerns
play a lesser role. Figure 1 illustrates this with a parametric example. The vertical axis
measures the strength of career concerns (σ2) and the horizontal axis the cost of eﬀort c.
Group-based incentives are optimal in the region below the cutoﬀ ˆ σ2(c), where career concerns
are relatively weak in relation to the eﬀort cost. Team production is optimal in the shaded
region above ˆ σ2(c), where career concerns are relatively strong.
245 Discussion and conclusion
Group-based incentives and team production – the policies that are optimal in our model
according to Proposition 2 – have become a staple in modern ﬁrms.20 Such policies are
optimal despite the lack of payoﬀ externalities or costs for helping a co-worker in our model
– factors that have previously been associated with group- or team-based incentives (e.g.
Itoh 1991, Hemmer 1995).
What our model adds to the literature is the notion that joint production settings oﬀer em-
ployees opportunities to impose informational externalities on the work outcomes. For this
reason career concerns can have a distinct eﬀect on employees’ motivation i) to put eﬀort
into developing knowledge inputs; ii) to cooperate in implementing knowledge inputs. Our
analysis shows that employees’ concerns for their labor market reputation can both be ‘good’
(enhancing incentives for eﬀort provision) and ‘bad’ (getting in the way of coordination). One
role of cooperation-enhancing elements in the human-resource policy of a ﬁrm therefore is
to deﬂect the detrimental eﬀect that employees’ career concerns could otherwise have on the
production outcome. Together with the results in the literature this suggests that there is in-
deed a robust theoretical foundation for the philosophy of fostering cooperation that underlies
human-resource policies in modern ﬁrms.
The comparative statics of our model in Proposition 3 shed light on a possible link between
the growing importance of “empowered” teams in ﬁrms and changes in labor markets that
have aﬀected the strength of individuals’ career concerns. Rapid technological progress in-
creased the importance of “knowledge work” in the US and other advanced economies over
the last three decades (e.g. Despres and Hiltrop 1995, OECD 1996, 2001, Foray 2004). The
resulting shifts in labor demand21 enhanced returns to skill, both linked to easily observed
components (such as education and experience) as well as linked to measures of unobserved
ability (e.g. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993, Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995, Bartel and
Sicherman 1999, Galor and Moav 2000, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002). In a parallel
development, ﬁrms introduced innovative organizational practices and increasingly restruc-
tured production processes to rely on “empowered” teams. By the mid-1990s more than 60%
of larger U.S. establishments had adopted teams and other “innovative workplace practices”
according to the inﬂuential studies by Osterman (1994, 2000). For knowledge-intensive ﬁrms
20Around 70% of the Fortune 1000 companies had adopted work group or team incentives by 1993 according
to surveys by the Center for Eﬀective Organizations, University of Southern California reported in Lawler,
Mohrman, and Ledford (1995). See also Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) and Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007).
21For a discussion of the controversial issues surrounding these changes in labor markets, see e.g. Card and
DiNardo (2002) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008).
25these developments are especially important, because their focus on innovation exposes them
to the coordination and information sharing problems at the heart of our model (e.g. Despres
and Hiltrop 1995, Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman 1995, Faraj and Sproull 2000, Paulus and
Yang 2000, Lawler 2003). Proposition 3 predicts that knowledge-intensive ﬁrms should switch
to team-based production when employees’ work outcomes have a strong eﬀect on their labor
market opportunities – in line with the above trends. This result thus suggests the intriguing
possibility of a connection between stronger career concerns that employees face because of
changes in labor markets and shifts in human-resource policies in knowledge-intensive ﬁrms.
An interesting avenue for future research is to explore empirically this link between human
resource policies and labor market conditions.
Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
The arguments in the main text derive the equilibria. What remains to be shown is that
the smoke-screen equilibrium under the IR-regime is the unique trembling-hand perfect Nash
equilibrium. Consider the alternative candidate equilibrium: the coordination equilibrium
where team members always attempt to implement high-quality inputs. Suppose that trembles
cause coordination to fail with probability ξ > 0. The coordination equilibrium is a trembling-
hand perfect Nash equilibrium only if we can show that it is the limit of a sequence of Nash
equilibria indexed by ξ. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that some ξ > 0 leads to a Nash
equilibrium with no coordination failure. We now construct the corresponding market beliefs
based on Bayes’ rule, and show that for an agent who does not have a high-quality input it is
a strict best reply not to coordinate, leading to a contradiction.
E[θi|L1,L2] =
Prob(xx = LL)θL + ξ

Prob(xx = LH)(θL + θH)/2 + Prob(xx = HH)θH	
Prob(xx = LL) + ξ [Prob(xx = LH) + Prob(xx = HH)]
=
(1 − α)2 θL + ξ

2α(1 − α)(θL + θH)/2 + α2 θH	
(1 − α)2 + ξ α (2 − α)
= θL +
ξ α
(1 − α)2 + ξ α (2 − α)
(θH − θL) > E[θi|Li,H−i] = θL.
The smoke-screen equilibrium is robust to small trembles in the players’ coordination decision,
as is easily veriﬁed.
Proof of Lemma 2.
The ﬁrst part was shown in the main text. Clearly, it will never be optimal for the principal
26to oﬀer a contract where she pays more than is needed to achieve coordination in any of
the available continuation equilibria, so we can safely ignore the continuation equilibria with
τi(Li,H−i) > σ2
1−¯ θ2.
Note that the principal could possibly sway the market to expect no coordination failure even
if the contract only oﬀered a smaller “compensation” τi(Li,H−i) > 0. In that case, the market
wages would be E[θi|Li,H−i] = E[θi|L1,L2]; and τi(Li,H−i) > 0 would ensure that it is
indeed a best response for the agents to coordinate. In other words, there is a continuum of
continuation equilibria with τi(Li,H−i) ∈ (0, σ2
1−¯ θ2), where coordination failure does not arise.
These alternative continuation equilibria however are not unique. For τi(Li,H−i) ∈ (0, σ2
1−¯ θ2)
the market may just as well expect coordination failure (CF) to arise. The resulting second-
period wage E[θi|L1,L2]CF > E[θi|Li,H−i]+τi(Li,H−i) makes it a best response for an agent
with a low-quality input not to coordinate, conﬁrming the market belief.
Proof of Lemma 3.
For τi(Li,H−i) → 0 the contract achieves the eﬀort implementation cost of the no-
coordination-stage benchmark in the limit because the free-riding problem disappears. The
upper bound on implementation cost is achieved if the principal must oﬀer τi(Li,H−i) =
σ2/(1 − ¯ θ2) to move the market away from expecting coordination failure in the continuation
game. Then an agent’s expected payoﬀ when not putting in eﬀort is
¯ θ
1−¯ θ2 σ2 higher than
the payoﬀ from shirking in the no-coordination-stage benchmark setting. To quantify the
impact this has on the implementation cost, plug w2i(Li,H−i) = τi(Li,H−i) + E[θi|Li,·] and
w2i(L1,L2) = E[θi|Li,·] into the agent’s incentive constraint. The anticipated second-period
wage following a successfully implemented high-quality input, w2i(Hi,·), hence has to satisfy22
¯ θw2i(Hi,·) + (1 − ¯ θ)E[θi|Li,·] + ¯ θ(1 − ¯ θ)
σ2
1 − ¯ θ2 − c ≥
¯ θ
1 − ¯ θ2 σ2 + E[θi|Li,·].













+ ¯ θ −
σ2
1 − ¯ θ2,E[θi|Hi,·]

.
Expressed in terms of bonus that the contract has to promise after a high-quality input is
implemented we get:





1 + ¯ θ(1 − ¯ θ)




22This wage structure is without loss of generality because the principal and agent are indiﬀerent between
payments following (H1,H2) or following (Hi,L−i), or some combination of the two, as long as the they have
the same expected value.
27From this we obtain the upper bound given in the result:
EC
IR = ¯ θτi(Hi,·) + ¯ θ(1 − ¯ θ)τi(Li,H−i).
Proof of Lemma 4.
The market wages in the second period are:
E[θi|H,H] = ¯ θ + σ2
¯ θ , E[θi|L,L] = ¯ θ − σ2
1−¯ θ,
E[θi|H,H] > E[θi|L,H] = 1
2 (E[θi|H,H] + E[θi|L,L]) = ¯ θ + 1−2 ¯ θ
¯ θ (1−¯ θ) σ2 > E[θi|L,L].










The result obtains because ECTR = ¯ θ2 τi(H,H).
Proof of Proposition 2.
We start by deriving the contract when coordination failure is not prevented. As coordination
occurs only if both agents develop high-quality knowledge inputs, the incentive constraint
becomes
¯ θ2 w2i(H1,H2) + (1 − ¯ θ2)E[θi|L1,L2]CF − c ≥ E[θi|L1,L2]CF,
⇔ w2i(H1,H2) ≥
c
¯ θ2 + E[θi|L1,L2]CF.
Hence, the bonus after an implemented high-quality input has to be





¯ θ(1 − ¯ θ2)

.
This leads to expected cost per head of implementing eﬀort






1−¯ θ2 σ2 if σ2 ≤ 1−¯ θ2
¯ θ c ≡ σ2
CF,
0 otherwise.
Next, we compare the above contract with team production (TR-regime). For easier reference,






2(1−¯ θ) if σ2 ≤ 2(1 − ¯ θ)c ≡ σ2
TR,
0 otherwise.
The TR-regime strictly dominates: i) expected revenue per head is greater by an amount
¯ θ(1 − ¯ θ) because coordination failure is averted, and ii) the expected implementation cost is
28(weakly) lower:23





2(1+¯ θ) > 0 if σ2 ≤ σ2
TR,
ECCF ≥ 0 otherwise.
The only alternative are group-based incentives (IR-regime) which also prevent coordination
failure. So whatever the optimal regime is, coordination failure never arises.
Proof of Proposition 3.
By Proposition 2, the only candidates are team production (TR-regime) and group-based
incentives (IR-regime). Both achieve the same expected revenue. By Lemma 3, the imple-
mentation costs for group-based incentives (IR-regime) are ECIR ∈ (ECNB,EC
IR]. We







1−¯ θ2 if σ2 ≤ 1−¯ θ2
1+¯ θ (1−¯ θ) c ≡ σ2
IR,
¯ θ






1−¯ θ if σ2 ≤ (1 − ¯ θ)c ≡ σ2
NB,
0 otherwise.









≥ ECTR − EC
IR = σ2
2(1−¯ θ) > 0 if σ2 ≤ σ2
TR = 2(1 − ¯ θ)c,
= −ECIR otherwise.
Thus, no matter which continuation equilibria arise under group-based incentives (IR-regime),
team production is optimal if and only if σ2 > 2(1 − ¯ θ)c ≡ ˆ σ2(c).
B More than two ability levels
We extend here the setting from Section 3 to N possible ability levels θn, ordered by index
n = 1,...,N.: θ1 < θ2 < ··· < θN. Denote the prior probability that agent i has ability level
θn by αn ≡ Prob(θi = θn). As in Section 3, the ability level of an agent also describes the
maximum input quality that he can achieve for his part of the project. The project has an O-
ring type technology (Kremer 1993): without coordination the lowest potential input quality
(i.e. ability level) among the team members determines the implemented input qualities.
(x1,x2) = (θmin,θmin) without coordination, where θmin = min{θ1,θ2}.






¯ θ c > 0.
29Coordination allows agents to raise the quality of an implemented input up to its full potential.
For example, agent 1 can adapt his project contribution to be compatible with innovative
features proposed by the more able team mate 2. Thus, if θ1 = θn1, θ2 = θn2 and 1 ≤ n1 <
n2 ≤ N the quality of implemented inputs
(x1,x2) ∈ {(θn1,θn1),(θn1,θn1+1),...,(θn1,θn2)} if coordination occurs.
Consider ﬁrst the IR-regime. Suppose that agent 1 is just short of the maximum ability
level, θ1 = θN−1, and the other agent reaches it, θ2 = θN. The situation mirrors the setting
from Section 3: agent 1 cannot gain from coordination and, given that the market expects
coordination failure for such a situation, the strict best response of agent 1 is not to coordinate.
Speciﬁcally, when observing implemented input quality proﬁle (θN−1,θN−1) the market allows
for the possibility that one of the agents actually has a higher ability level and holds belief
E[θ1|x1 = θN−1,x2 = θN−1] =
(αN−1)2 θN−1 + 2αN αN−1 (θN + θN−1)/2
(αN−1)2 + 2αN αN−1
> E[θ1|x1 = θN−1,x2 = θN] = θN−1.
The same argument applies for all situations in which the agents turn out to have diﬀerent
ability levels, and we are left with a smoke-screen equilibrium. To show this, work backwards
to construct the market beliefs. As we saw, the implemented input quality proﬁle (θN−1,θN−1)
is associated with the agents indeed both having that ability level or one of them being more
able. Proﬁle (θN−2,θN−2) hence leaves open the possibilities θ1 = θ2 = θN−2 as well as
θ1 = θN−2 and θ2 > θN−2 or θ2 = θN−2 and θ1 > θN−2:
E[θi|xi = θN−2,x−i = θN−2]
=
(αN−2)2 θN−2 + 2αN αN−2 (θN + θN−2)/2 + 2αN−1 αN−2 (θN−1 + θN−2)/2
(αN−1)2 + 2αN αN−2 + 2αN−1 αN−2
=
(αN−2)2 θN−2 + Prob(θ1 6= θ2;θ1,θ2 ≥ θN−2)E[(θ1 + θ2)/2|θ1 6= θ2;θ1,θ2 ≥ θN−2]
(αN−1)2 + Prob(θ1 6= θ2;θ1,θ2 ≥ θN−2)
,
Again, coordination failure leads to a higher reputation than being alone in contributing the
relatively lower quality input xi = θN−2: E[θi|xi = θN−2,x−i > θN−2] = θN−2. By induction,
therefore for implemented input quality proﬁle (θn,θn), 1 ≤ n < N,
E[θi|xi = θn,x−i = θn] =
(αn)2 θn + Prob(θ1 6= θ2;θ1,θ2 ≥ θn)E[(θ1 + θ2)/2|θ1 6= θ2;θ1,θ2 ≥ θn]
(αn)2 + Prob(θ1 6= θ2;θ1,θ2 ≥ θn)
> E[θi|xi = θn,x−i > θn] = θn.
It is straightforward that under the TR-regime both agents gain in terms of reputation when-
ever the average quality of the project inputs increases. Hence, agents always coordinate to
implement the highest possible quality level: (x,x) = (θ1,θ2). Thus, we can conclude that
Proposition 1 extends to this setting.
30C Additional signal available about coordination
Lacking cooperation in a group often produces signs of stress or conﬂict. Section 3 assumed
such signals are not observed by the market. Suppose now that in case of coordination failure
the market observes such a ‘stress’ signal S = CF in addition to the project outcome. There-
fore, in the absence of evidence for coordination failure, a low-quality group outcome under
the IR-regime can only be attributed to lack of ability, so E[θi|L1,L2,S = ∅] = θL. However,
with such evidence E[θi|L1,L2,S = CF] > θL if the market places at least some probability
on coordination to fail when an agent is less successful than his project partner. This makes
it a strict best response for an agent to create this ‘stress’ signal whenever he cannot con-
tribute a high-quality input. So on the equilibrium path, the outcome (L1,L2) always occurs
in conjunction with S = CF and equilibrium beliefs are just as in Section 3.
Again, team production guarantees coordination will occur because it removes the reputational
source of conﬂict. The argument is more subtle though: one needs to rule out the possibility
of a self-fulﬁlling expectation by the market that coordination fails in the presence of high-
quality inputs. To show that such a belief unravels and cannot be an equilibrium, suppose the
market always expected coordination failure. Then it is still a strict best response for agents
to coordinate if they both have a high-quality input because E[θi|L1,L2,S = CF] < θH. Now,
if the market expected that coordination failure occurs unless both agents have a high-quality
input, E[θi|L,L,S = CF] would be equal to E[θi|L1,L2] from (1) in Section 3. But, in this
case too, it is a strict best response to reveal that one team member has high ability because
Section 3 shows that E[θi|L,H] > E[θi|L1,L2]. Thus, in any equilibrium team members always
coordinate to implement high-quality inputs. So, Proposition 1 extends to this setting.
D Asymmetric priors
In many circumstances project members will diﬀer in characteristics such as age, experience,
and education. As we discuss here, this however has no eﬀect on the structure of the coordina-
tion problem. Suppose, without loss of generality, that agent 1 has a better prior reputation
than agent 2, i.e. α1 > α2. By the same argument as in Section 3, there is coordination failure
when only one agent has access to a high-quality input: the other agent can never improve
his reputation by coordinating and thus has nothing to gain. All that changes is that in the
resulting smoke-screen equilibrium we have diﬀerent posteriors when no high-quality inputs
are implemented,
E[θi|L1,L2] = θL +
αi (1 − α−i)
1 − αi α−i
(θH − θL). (19)
31Coordination under the TR-regime is not aﬀected by this change in information structure.
But posteriors here, too, now also depend on the prior about an agent:
E[θi|L,H] = θL +
αi (1 − α−i)
α1 (1 − α2) + α2 (1 − α1)
(θH − θL). (20)
E Implemented inputs are only observed after a success
Implemented inputs in a project may in some cases only be observable in case of a successful
outcome (e.g. patents, academic publications). To capture this, we modify here the setup from
Section 3 by assuming that the project outcome can either be a success (y = 1) or a failure
(y = 0). The probability of the project succeeding depends on the quality of implemented
inputs x1,x2. Denote this by px1x2 ≡ Prob(y = 1|x1,x2), and suppose that 1 ≥ pHH > pLH =
pHL > pLL ≥ 0. If the project succeeds, project inputs are observed. Otherwise it is only
known that the project failed. As in Section 3, the project aﬀects the agents’ reputation but
has no other direct monetary payoﬀ.
As it turns out, this information structure only reinforces the result from Proposition 1 that
there is coordination failure with individual records. We build some intuition for this before
proceeding to show the result formally. Suppose agent 2 only has a low-quality input. If
y = 1, inputs are revealed and agent 2 only has low quality to show. In contrast, there
is no information about inputs if y = 0. Because in the latter case the market factors in
the possibility that agent 2 might have had a high-quality input and just was unlucky, his
reputation following y = 0 is higher than if y = 1. From his perspective it is therefore optimal
to reduce the chances of the outcome y = 1 by not coordinating to implement his team mate’s
high-quality input.
To show the argument formally suppose, by way of contradiction, that market partici-
pants expect team members to always coordinate and implement high-quality inputs. Then,
E[θi|L1,L2;y = 1]C = E[θi|Li,H−i;y = 1]C = θL, where superscript C indicates that
the reputation was derived using the coordination presumption of the market. Moreover,
Prob(y = 1)C = α2 pHH + 2α(1 − α)pLH + (1 − α)2 pLL. Hence,
E[θi|y = 0]C =
α2 (1 − pHH)θH + 2α(1 − α)(1 − pLH)(θL + θH)/2
1 − Prob(y = 1)C
+
(1 − α)2 (1 − pLL (1 − pLH)θL
1 − Prob(y = 1)C
= θL +
α2 (1 − pHH) + α(1 − α)(1 − pLH)
Prob(y = 0)C (θH − θL)
> E[θi|L1,L2;y = 1]C = E[θi|Li,H−i;y = 1]C = θL.
32As a result, the success state is less desirable for an agent with a low-quality input than
y = 0. His strict best response therefore is not to coordinate and thereby reduce the chance
of outcome y = 1 from pLH to pLL. This contradicts market beliefs.
To show that the smoke-screen equilibrium indeed exists, suppose now that the market ex-
pects coordination failure unless both team members develop high-quality inputs. A useful
short cut for computations is to notice that whenever we face a situation with implemented
inputs (L1,L2), be they visible (y = 1) or not (y = 0), the expected ability of an agent is
equal to E[θi|L1,L2] from equation (1) in Section 3. Denoting reputations derived under the
coordination failure presumption with superscript CF, we have
E[θi|L1,L2;y = 1]CF = θL +
α
1 + α




> E[θi|Li,H−i;y = 1]CF = θL.
The expected success probability now is Prob(y = 1)CF = α2 pHH + (1 − α2)pLL, and
E[θi|y = 0]CF =
α2 (1 − pHH)θH + (1 − α2)(1 − pLL)E[θi|L1,L2;y = 1]CF
Prob(y = 0)CF
= E[θi|L1,L2;y = 1]CF +
α2 (1 − pHH)
Prob(y = 0)CF
 
θH − E[θi|L1,L2;y = 1]CF
> E[θi|L1,L2;y = 1]CF.
We thus conclude that it is a best response for an agent with a low-quality input not to
coordinate. First, this increases the reputation that the agent has conditional on being in
state y = 1: E[θi|L1,L2;y = 1]CF > E[θi|Li,H−i;y = 1]CF. Second, this increases the
chances of being in state y = 0, which provides the highest possible reputation that the agent
can hope to achieve: E[θi|y = 0]CF > E[θi|L1,L2;y = 1]CF.
As is straightforward to verify, coordination under the TR-regime is not aﬀected by this change
in information structure. Both agents can only gain from increasing the average expected
ability of a team member by implementing high-quality inputs.
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